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Abstract
This paper analyzes the ability of credit default swap spreads, bond spreads
and stock prices to anticipate the decisions of the main rating agencies, for
the largest international banks. Conditional on negative rating events, all the
three indicators show signi¯cant abnormal changes before both announcements
of review and actual credit rating changes, but rating actions still seem to
convey new information to the market. Results for positive rating events
are less clear-cut with the market indicators generally showing abnormal
behaviors only in conjunction with the events. As for the predictive power of
the ¯nancial indicators examined, the CDS market is particularly useful for
negative events and stock prices for positive events. However, all indicators
also send many false signals and are to be interpreted with care.
JEL classi¯cation: G14, G21.
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¤Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction1
Over the past few years, after the collapse of large companies such as Enron
and Parmalat, rating agencies have been strongly criticized for having failed to
lower their credit ratings quickly enough. Some observers argued that market-based
indicators, and especially those derived from the credit derivatives market, are much
better than rating agencies in evaluating the \true" credit worthiness of debtors and
that too often \markets" are able to anticipate rating announcements:
\The derivatives market is quick to spot companies that have any credit
weakness. Indeed, measured over a year, it is better at predicting defaults
than rating agencies, which can be slow to downgrade companies."
John Gapper, Financial Times, May 25, 2004
On the other hand, FitchRatings (2003) shows some evidence that
\... having now had the opportunity to observe CDS spreads over the
full cycle of decline and rebound, it is worth noting that CDS spreads
also widened dramatically for many other investment-grade companies
in 2002, only to completely reverse course one year later. Now that the
credit markets have begun to stabilize, it is easy to observe that, despite a
number of successes, market-based indicators, in addition to being quite
volatile, also sent many false positives."
From a theoretical point of view it is not clear if \markets" or rating agencies
have some comparative advantages. In fact, while market-based indicators can react
immediately to news, rating agencies need some time for processing new information.
1The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not involve the responsibility
of the Bank of Italy. I thank my colleagues at the Economic Research Department of the Bank of
Italy and anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. The de¯nitive
version of this paper has been published by Blackwell Publishing, on behalf of the Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena, in Economic Notes, No. 35, pp. 121-150 (available at www.blackwell-synergy.com).
All errors are my own. E-mail: antonio.dicesare@bancaditalia.it .8
However, rating agencies can usually access con¯dential business data, not available
to the market as a whole 2. Hence the evaluation of the two sentences mentioned
above is mainly a matter of empirical research. Indeed, the literature on the
relationship between market-based indicators and credit ratings given by specialized
agencies is quite large. Several papers explored the links between credit ratings and
stock prices (Pinches and Singleton, 1978; Gri±n and Sanvicente, 1982; Holthausen
and Leftwich, 1986; Glascock et al., 1987; Cornell et al., 1989; Goh and Ederington,
1993 and 1999; Dichev and Piotrosky, 2001; Vassalou and Xing, 2003), credit ratings
and bond prices (Katz, 1974; Grier and Katz, 1976; Hettenhouse and Sartoris, 1976;
Weinstein, 1977; Wansley et al., 1992; Cantor et al., 1997; Hite and Warga, 1997;
Steiner and Heinke, 2001; Dynkin et al., 2002) and credit ratings and stock and
bond prices (Hand et al., 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Gropp et al., 2002). Results
did not reach a complete consensus, but there seems to be a widespread agreement
that market-based indicators generally react to rating agencies' announcements,
sometimes even in advance, and that the reaction is greater for negative events than
for positive events.
Recently, in parallel with the development of the credit derivatives market3, a
few papers began exploring the relationship between the credit default swap (CDS)
market4 and rating events. Hull et al. (2004) analyze events from Moody's, ¯nding
2Gonzales et al. (2004) give a survey on the role of credit agencies in modern ¯nancial markets.
3According to the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the notional value of
credit derivatives outstanding at the end of the year was USD 8.4 trillion in 2004, compared with
3.8 trillion a year before and just USD 1.0 trillion in 2001. An overview of the credit derivatives
market can be found in Rule (2001) and Committee on the Global Financial System (2003).
4Credit default swaps are over-the-counter ¯nancial instruments that allow people to transfer
the credit risk related to one or more reference entities. The buyer of a CDS pays a premium,
generally with quarterly or semiannual frequency, on a speci¯ed notional amount for a given period
of time and, if a credit event related to one of the reference entities occurs during the life of the
contract, the holder of the CDS has the right to receive the notional amount of the contract and
the obligation to deliver the same notional value of debt securities issued by the reference entity for
which the credit event occurred (physical settlement). In some cases, the buyer of the CDS has the
right to receive the di®erence between the notional and the market value of defaulted debts (cash9
that reviews for downgrade contain signi¯cant information for CDS spreads, while
downgrades and negative outlooks do not; moreover the CDS market anticipates
all the three types of events and provides useful information for estimating the
probability of negative events; results for positive events are much less meaningful.
Norden and Weber (2004) examine both the CDS and the stock markets and events
from the three main international rating agencies; they argue that both markets
anticipate negative rating events. Zhu (2004) ¯nd that CDS spreads increase (decrease)
faster than bond spreads before a rating downgrade (upgrade), but the discrepancy
is almost fully removed shortly after the rating event. Despite of the predictive
power of the CDS market, Micu et al. (2004) ¯nd that rating events still have
short-term impacts on credit spreads.
The growing attention of the literature towards the credit derivatives market
is due to the characteristics of these contracts, that make them potentially more
e±cient than other ¯nancial instruments in establishing the \right" price of credit
risk. For instance, the short selling of credit risk, which is straightforward with a
CDS, is limited in the bond market by the low level of liquidity of the repo market,
especially for high yield issues, and by the short maturity of the repo contracts.
Blanco et al. (2005) con¯rm that, even if in the long run both CDS and bond
markets re°ect ¯rm-speci¯c variables equally, CDS spreads are better integrated
with those factors in the short run. Also Zhu (2004) ¯nd that credit risk tends to be
priced equally in the two markets in the long run, but the derivatives market seems
to lead the cash market in anticipating rating events and in adjusting the prices.
The main characteristics of this paper, whose aim is to further investigate the
relationship between market-based indicators and rating events, are the followings:
² Rating events from the three main international rating agencies (Moody's
settlement). Usually, CDSs o®er protection against credit events such as bankruptcy, failure to pay
and restructuring; for sovereign issuers, repudiation and moratoria are also included. According to
the British Bankers' Association (2004), currently nearly a half of the credit derivatives market is
represented by single-name CDSs, which are contracts that insure against the credit risk associated
with a single debtor.10
Investors Service, Standard & Poor's CreditWire and FitchRatings) are taken
into account;
² Indicators from three ¯nancial markets, the credit default swap, the bond and
the stock markets, are used;
² The focus is on the largest international banks.
Using information from the three main rating agencies is particularly important
from a methodological point of view. As shown by Micu et al. (2004), results can
be substantially di®erent if one controls for rating changes that have been preceded
by other rating events. Also Hull et al. (2004), in the work that inspired this paper,
decided to drop those cases that were preceded by other events, in order to control for
contamination; on the other hand they only used data from Moody's, thus leaving
the door open to cross-agencies contaminations. Indeed, since it would be di±cult
to defend the predominance of a rating agency on the others, it seems natural to
use simultaneously data from all the three rating agencies that are unanimously
recognized to be the most important.
The decision to use market-based indicators coming from credit derivatives,
bond and stock markets probably do not require a long explanation. As it has
been said before, CDSs should theoretically be the most e±cient instruments for
evaluating the credit worthiness of a ¯rm, but the comparison with indicators coming
from other markets is a task that is certainly worth to pursue.
The choice of focusing on a particular industry, the one constituted by the
largest international banks, could seem too much restrictive and not necessary. It
is undoubtedly true that by doing so the number of rating events that are used
cannot be as large as in previous papers, and this could lead to results that are
less precise. However, the banks in the sample are among the companies with the
greatest amounts of debt outstanding, so that the economical relevance of any of the
company studied in this paper is much larger than that of the average ¯rm used in
works with larger samples; it is thus interesting to check whether previous ¯ndings11
in the literature still hold for the banking sector only or not. Moreover, focusing on
¯rms which have almost surely liquid CDSs, bonds and stocks probably mitigates
other issues arising when using tons of data of illiquid instruments of unknown ¯rms.
Another potential criticism is that most of the banks have very high credit ratings
and, moreover, in many countries the banking system is also perceived to have a
more or less explicit public guarantee. Essentially, since banks are considered to
be \too big to fail" the CDS market for these companies would be less relevant.
It is just the case to remember that CDSs o®er protection not only against the
bankruptcy of the reference entity, an issue that is certainly not credible for a large
bank in almost all countries in the world, but also against the failure to pay and
the restructuring, events that do not seem to be so unlikely for a bank that should
face serious ¯nancial di±culties. The fact that banks usually maintain high credit
ratings only make the task of verifying if ¯nancial indicators are so sensible to re°ect
small variations in credit worthiness more challenging, and interesting.
The following section contains the description of the data set. Following Hull
et al. (2004), I analyze how CDS spreads, OASs and stock prices change conditional
on rating events in Section 3 and I estimate the probability that rating events occur
given the changes of the market-based indicators in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. The data set
The data set refers to the largest5 42 publicly listed international banks, from
11 countries. Four years of daily CDS spreads, option-adjusted spreads (OASs) and
stock prices were downloaded from Bloomberg6, for the period from August 2001 to
5By market capitalization.
6Credit default swap spreads refer to 5-year contracts written on senior debts and are
denominated in euro for all banks except for American and Japanese banks, where they are
denominated in US dollars. Option-adjusted spreads refer to bonds with ¯x coupons, no embedded
options, and maturities as close as possible to 5 years; option-adjusted spreads for bonds without
embedded options represent, in basis points, by how much the benchmark yield curve has to be
shifted in order to make the present value of the cash-°ows of the securities, discounted using the
shifted curve, equal to their market values; Bloomberg uses yield curves on government bonds as12
July 2005. Missing data were replaced with interpolated values and, in order to have
comparable data among indicators, only those days for which the three indicators
were all available were kept, for a total of 36,575 daily quotes for any indicator.
Table 1 gives a few descriptive statistics of the data set. Since all banks included
in the sample always maintained an investment grade status, both CDS spreads
and OASs were rather small on average, with overall means equal to just about 30
and 70 basis point, respectively. On the other hand, all the three indicators had
substantial °uctuations, with large ratios between maximum and minimum values.
From Bloomberg I got also a set of 512 rating events from Moody's, Standard &
Poor's and Fitch 7. The set of events includes both reviews for rating changes
and actual rating changes, but excludes those cases in which a rating con¯rmation
followed an announcement of review, since these events cannot be properly classi¯ed
as either reviews for rating changes or actual rating changes. Events related to the
same bank that happened in the same day were grouped together, for a total of 167
days in which an event occurred for some bank. Notice that the di®erent \intensity"
of the rating events is not taken into account; this means that, for any bank, rating
events occurred in the same day, from one or more agencies, for one or more rating
types and for one or more notches were considered as one rating event only. On the
other hand, cases in which two or more rating agencies took decisions in the same
day and cases in which rating changes occurred for more than one notch were rather
rare, thus preventing any meaningful speci¯c statistical analysis.
benchmarks. Stock prices are end-of-day prices.
7Throughout the paper, I will refer to negative rating events for reviews for downgrade and
actual downgrades, to positive rating events for reviews for upgrade and actual upgrades, and to
rating events for negative and positive rating events. The following rating types were included in
the data set: 1) for Moody's, issuer rating, bank ¯nancial strength, long-term debt in national
currency, long-term debt in foreign currency, long-term bank deposits, short-term debt, senior
secured debt, senior unsecured debt, junior subordinated debt and subordinated debt; 2) for S&P,
long-term foreign issuer credit, long-term local issuer credit, short-term foreign issuer credit and
short-term local issuer credit; 3) for Fitch, short-term debt, senior secured debt, senior unsecured
debt, junior subordinated debt and subordinated debt. Unfortunately, I was not able to ¯nd
historical data for the potentially important rating type \outlook".13
3. Abnormal price changes conditional on rating events
The purpose of this set of tests is to verify if market-based indicators behave
abnormally during some time intervals related to rating events. In order to de¯ne
what an \abnormal movement" is, for any of the three market-based indicators, a
daily market index is constructed as the average of the price changes of the indicators
during every day in the sample8. Since the market index should not be contaminated
by the e®ects of rating events, only daily price changes which referred to banks for
which a credit event did not happen either in the previous or in the following 126
days 9 (or 6 months) were used. Then, for any bank the abnormal price change
(APC) of a market-based indicator during a day is de¯ned as the di®erence between
the actual price change of that indicator and the corresponding market index 10.
Another fundamental de¯nition is that of the cumulative abnormal price change
(CAPC) of an indicator in the interval [n1;n2], which is the sum of the APCs for
that indicator in the days included in the interval, where n1 and n2 are days from
the credit event11.
8Price changes are de¯ned as simple changes for CDS spreads and OASs and as log-returns for
stock prices. The market index was calculated only when at least ¯ve prices were available. I also
used a market index based on the median instead of the average value, with results remarkably
similar to the ones reported below.
9When speaking of \days" I will always mean \working days".
10It is worth noting that the APCs for the OASs are (almost) independent of the risk-free
benchmark curve used to calculate the OASs. In fact, one could argue that using OASs calculated
using, for instance, the swap curve instead of the yield curve on government bonds would potentially
make a di®erence. Notice that if all OASs referred to bonds denominated in the same currency, the
benchmark curve would not be relevant at all, since APCs are de¯ned as di®erences between OASs
and averages of OASs calculated with respect to the same benchmark curve. Actually, in the data
set there are both OASs calculated on bonds denominated in euros and OASs calculated on bonds
denominated in US dollars; hence, APCs could indeed be sensible to di®erences in the relative
movements of yield curves on government bonds and other potential benchmark yield curves in
the two currencies. All in all, since I analyzed movements of the indicators during short period
of times, I do not believe that a particular choice for the benchmark curve would really make a
relevant di®erence.
11Both n1 and n2 can be negative or positive, for days preceding or following the credit event,14
All tests described in this subsection are applied to the interval [-40,5] and to
the subintervals [-40,-2], [-1,1] and [2,5] in order to verify abnormal movements of the
markets before, in concomitance and after rating events. To avoid contamination
of the data, only those events that were neither preceded, in the previous 40 days,
nor followed, in the following 5 days, by other rating events for the same bank are
included in the sample. Table 2 shows the numbers of rating events, divided by
rating agency, that are analyzed.
In order to verify if CAPCs were signi¯cantly greater or smaller than zero, a
standard t-test could be used. However, since the distribution of the CAPCs could
be non-normal and the number of observations is sometimes small, I preferred to
use the bootstrap technique suggested by Efron e Tibshirani (1993) to determine
the relevant con¯dence intervals. Let ~ si = si ¡ ¹ s, where s1;s2;:::;sn are the sample
values of the CAPCs and ¹ s is the sample mean. The null hypothesis is that the
distribution of the CAPCs corresponds to the distribution in which the ~ s1;:::; ~ sn can
occur with the same probability (the null distribution). Drawing with replacements
for many times a sample with n elements from the null distribution and computing
tn =
p
n(¹ sn=^ ¾n), where ¹ sn and ^ ¾n are the sample mean and standard deviation, it
is possible to ¯nd the empirical distribution of t under the null hypothesis 12. By
comparing t with the desired percentile of this distribution one can decide if the null
hypothesis has to be rejected or not for a given con¯dence level.
I also run a test based on the sign of the CAPCs. Under the null hypothesis
that 50 per cent of the CAPCs are positive, and the remaining 50 per cent are
negative, the probability ¼(n;N) of having n positive (or negative) CAPCs over N














n!(N¡n)!. In a one-sided test, the p-value associated with the realization




12I drew 100,000 random samples to run this test.15
Figures 1.a-c show the average CAPCs for negative rating events in the intervals
[-40,5], that is from 40 days before to 5 days after the rating events. From the ¯gures
it is possible to see that all market-based indicators moved in the expected directions,
even if the overall behavior is sometimes rather di®erent, and that they seem to lead
the events. The statistical results reported in Table 3 give support to the visual
feeling: CAPCs in the intervals [-40,5] are always highly signi¯cant, except for OASs
conditional on reviews for downgrade and stock prices conditional on downgrades.
The later results, however, are heavily in°uenced by a Japanese bank which was
put under review for downgrade in November 2002 and was downgraded at the
end of January 2003. In the intervals [-40,5], the OASs and the stock prices of
this bank had two astonishing CAPCs of -90 basis points and 44 percentage points,
respectively for the two events, pro¯ting from the actions of the Bank of Japan which
was supporting the Japanese banking sector at that time. Without those events all
indicators would behave in a very similar way, showing signi¯cant CAPCs in the
intervals [-40,-2], thus supporting the hypothesis that these markets are indeed able
to move in advance with respect to rating agencies, but also in concomitance and,
for OASs, after the events. The later results signal that, even if the markets move in
advance with respect to the rating events, the decisions of the rating agencies still
convey new information to the agents.
As in previous studies, results for positive events are less clear-cut (¯gures 2.a-c
and Table 4) also for the banking sector. In the intervals [-40,5] the indicators always
moved in the expected directions on average, but generally not in a very signi¯cant
way. In particular CDS spreads only seem to react in concomitance or after the
events, showing an apparently poor ability to anticipate rating agency. Actually, as
it will become apparent with the second set of tests, the fact that CDS spreads did
not move signi¯cantly before the recorded positive events does not mean that this
market is not useful to predict this kind of rating events. To conclude the analysis
of positive events, it seems interesting to point out that market indicators almost
always react to positive rating news, that is in the interval [-1,-1], thus showing once
again that rating actions provide genuine new information.16
As said in the introduction, one of the main features of this paper is to use
rating events from three rating agencies. It is thus interesting to analyze if markets
react in the same way to news coming from the three agencies or if there are
peculiarities. Figures 3.a-c and 4.a-c report the average CAPCs for rating events
coming from one rating agency at a time. The wide di®erences in the behavior of the
market indicators seem to give a clear support to the choice of not focusing on one
rating agency only; actually, ¯nal results would be signi¯cantly di®erent depending
on which rating agency one decides to work on. However, it is useful to remember
that when working with just one rating agency the numbers of events included in
the samples are very small and results can be severely biased. For this reason, the
results of (not useful) formal tests are not reported for the single agencies and it is
preferable to leave the ¯gures only to highlight possible drawbacks of previous works
that did not use information from several agencies.
4. Rating events conditional on abnormal price changes
Norden and Weber (2004), using tests similar to those described in the previous
subsection, argue that CDS and stock markets are able to anticipate the decisions
of the rating agencies. However, such a conclusion do not seem conceptually correct
since it is based only on tests that are conditional on the realization of a particular
event and that do not control for those cases in which CAPCs gave false signals, that
is cases in which CAPCs were signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and were not followed
by rating events. In other words, to have a complete view of the relationships
between market-based indicators and rating events it is also necessary to verify the
facts reported in the second sentence quoted in the Introduction of this paper, which
is exactly what the set of tests described in this subsection aims to do.
In order to verify if market indicators are really useful to estimate the probability
that a rating event occurs, I calculated CAPCs on intervals of 40 and 120 days
(predictive windows)13 and I checked if in the following 40 days (observation window)
there was some rating event. I then estimated a probit model P = ©(®+¯0x) using
13I will report results for both predictive windows, since they are sometimes di®erent.17
a maximum likelihood estimator14. In this model P is the probability that a rating
event occurs, © is the cumulative standard normal distribution, ® and ¯ are the
parameters to be estimated and x is a set of explanatory variables. I ¯rst estimated
the parameters using the CAPCs of every one of the three market indicators as
exogenous variables. Then, in order to verify if one of the market indicators is
more useful than the others in predicting rating events, I also estimated the probit
model using CDS spreads, OASs and stock prices together (Model A). In both cases,
predictive windows which included rating events of any type were not considered.
Even if this approach considerably reduces the size of the sample, it avoids biases
related to the fact that rating actions by one rating agency could be anticipated by
other decisions of the same rating agency or by the other rating agencies. Then,
to asses how useful rating decisions are in order to predict other following rating
events, I estimated a probit model using as explanatory variables only two dummy
variables, that takes value 1 or zero if a positive or negative rating events occurred
or not during the predicting windows (Model B). At the end, to check if markets
add information to those provided by rating agencies, I estimated a probit model in
which both market-based indicators and dummy variables for rating events are used
(Model C).
Given that probit models could be criticized for assuming a particular functional
form for the relationship between the probability that a rating event occurs and
the exogenous variables, also a non-parametric test based on the percentiles of the
distribution of the single CAPCs was used. As before, I calculated the CAPCs on
intervals of 40 and 120 days and I veri¯ed if in the following 40 days a rating event
occurred. Observations were then divided into two classes: class G, containing the
greatest CAPCs, that is the CAPCs greater than a given percentile q, and class S,
containing the smallest CAPCs, that is the CAPCs smaller than the q percentile.
For both classes I calculated the number of rating events associated with them.
Under the null hypothesis that the probability that a rating event belongs to class
G is equal to 1 ¡ q=100 (and that q=100 is, therefore, the probability to belong to
14Results were con¯rmed by a logit model.18
class S), the probability ¼(n;N) of having exactly n events in class G, when the













In a one-sided test, the p-value associated with n CAPCs belonging to class G when
the total number of events is N is equal to
PN
i=n ¼(i;N). The p-value associated
with n CAPCs belonging to class S is instead equal to
Pn
i=0 ¼(N ¡i;N). In order to
check the robustness of the results, I applied a bootstrap technique, calculating the
statistics described above 1,000 times on random samples drawn with replacements
from the original set of time intervals. From the empirical distributions of the
statistics obtained in this way it was easy to determine the relevant con¯dence
intervals.
When using one market indicator at a time, estimated parameters for probit
models have always the expected signs and are signi¯cant, in both predictive windows
(Table 5.a). However, the measures of ¯t (McFadden, 1974 and Estrella, 1998) show
that the performance of CDS spreads is relatively much better than for the other two
indicators, and that OASs have indeed a poor capacity to predict negative events.
The tests on percentiles give further support to this analysis: results for CDSs are
always greatly signi¯cative whereas, when the predictive window is equal to 120
days, stock prices and OASs give many false signals in several cases. Hence, if a
relatively high movement for stock prices and OASs is observed in the future, it
should be borne in mind that in many cases in the past this fact did not mean
that a negative rating event was approaching, that is the credit worthiness of the
underlying bank was not decreasing in the judgment of the rating agencies. The
clear predominance of CDS spreads to convey information on future negative events
when a large predictive window is used is con¯rmed when all the three indicators
are used simultaneously to predict the events (Table 5.b, Model A): the estimated
coe±cients of the probit model are not signi¯cant for OASs and stock prices and
the overall ¯t of the model to the data is remarkably similar to the case in which
CDS spreads only are used.
All results presented up to now have been obtained limiting the analysis to19
those events that were not preceded during the predictive window by other rating
events. That is the above mentioned results are conditional on the fact that events
were not anticipated in any way by one or more rating agencies. However, results
of Model B show that signals coming from the rating agencies are very useful
in predicting other negative rating events. The presence of a negative (positive)
event in the predictive window increases (decreases) the probability of observing
a negative event in the observation window. This happens both because rating
agencies anticipate themselves by giving to the market the announcements of future
reviews and also because often one rating agency anticipate the others in the decisions
or, said in other words, all rating agencies generally do the same things but with some
leads and lags. When adding the market indicators to the rating decisions (Model
C) the overall ¯t of the model to the data increases considerably, thus showing that
all the three indicators add information to that provided by the rating agencies.
As for the capacity of market-based indicators to predict positive events, the
estimated parameters for probit models when the indicators are used separately are
always signi¯cant, but the measures of ¯t are smaller than for the corresponding
cases for negative events, with the exceptions of OASs and stock prices when the
predictive window is 120 days long (Table 6.a). Also the values of the tests on
percentile are usually smaller than their counterparts for negative events, but still
signi¯cant. When the three indicators are used together, the coe±cient of the CDS
spreads is no longer signi¯cant in Model A with the shorter predictive window and
in Model C with both windows (Table 6.b).
Having established that market indicators are indeed useful in predicting rating
events, another the question is: how often the market is correct? Or, said in other
words, how to interpret the reported measures of ¯t? In fact the pseudo-R2s of
binary models are not easily interpretable as measures of ¯t (cfr. Estrella, 1998).








where PY and PN represent those cases in which the model predicted a rating event
to occur and not to occur, respectively, RY and RN represent cases in which a rating
event was actually recorded and was not, respectively, the intersection symbol means
that both cases were realized and the symbol # stands for \number of elements of
the set". In words, i) is the percentage of cases in which the model predicted a
rating event and a rating event actually occurred and ii) represents the percentage
of cases in which the model predicted that there would be not rating events but
a rating event actually occurred. In order to de¯ne when the model predicted a
rating event I picked out as a threshold the probability level that makes the number
of predicted events equal to the number of realized events. Given that the total
number of cases in which the model predicted an event NPY is set to be equal to the
number of realized events NRY , which is smaller than the number of cases in which
there were no events NRN, it is possible to calculate the probability that in n cases
the predictions were correct under the null hypothesis that the model randomly
predicted the rating events as









It is thus possible to calculate also the p-value associated with the number n of
correct predictions of the probit model as
PNRY +NRN
i=n ¼1(n;NPY ;NRY ;NRN). Analogously,
the probability that in n cases there is a rating event out of NPN cases in which the
model predicts that there will be no events (where NPN is set to be equal NRN) is









and the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that a random model is the true
model is
PNRY
i=0 ¼2(n;NPY ;NRY ;NRN).
Table 5.c shows that, when the predictive window is equal to 120 days, 11 times
out of 100 the prediction of a negative events received from the CDS market was
indeed correct and only 2 times up to 100 the prediction of no negative events was
actually followed by a negative events. These results are statistically signi¯cant, that21
is we can con¯dentially reject the hypothesis that they are generated by a random
model. However, it also means that nothing happened in the 89 per cent of the cases
in which the CDS market predicted a negative event!!! The performance of OASs
and stock prices are even worse and also combining the three indicators together
do not substantially improve the results. On the other hand, when combining
market indicators and rating actions, the predictive power of the model signi¯cantly
increases, with about 40 per cent of correct predictions of negative events.
The fact noticed above that CDS spreads are not particularly useful in predicting
positive events is con¯rmed by the fact that the performance of Model A in terms of
percentage of correct predictions is worse than for the case in which only stock prices
are used (Table 6.c), thus suggesting that CDS spreads, and perhaps OASs that had
not an excellent performance either, only add noise to the information content of
stock prices. Overall, one should be able to correctly predict about 30 per cent
of positive rating events using both market-based indicators and information from
previous rating actions.
5. Conclusions
The paper analyzes the relationship between three market-based indicators and
rating events for a sample of international banks. All indicators are found to contain
useful information to anticipate rating actions from the main international agencies,
especially for negative events. It has to be said, however, that all indicators give also
many false signals. Overall, CDS spreads seem to be relatively more e±cient than
OASs and stock prices in anticipating negative rating events, whereas information
from stock prices is more valuable for predicting positive events. The bond market
seem to provide the less reliable indicators of future rating events, especially for
negative events when a large predictive windows is used: 99 per cent of the cases in
which the OASs would had predicted the arrival of a negative rating event were
wrong signals. The performance of the bond market improves signi¯cantly for
positive events. In order to explain this fact, it is probably useful to remember
that OASs contain not only a premium for expected losses due to defaults but also
premia related to tax e®ects, liquidity of the bond market and special di±culties22
concerning the diversi¯cation of risks of bond portfolios 15. My conjecture, whose
empirical veri¯cation is left for future work, is that the low liquidity of the bond
market is the best candidate for explaining this ¯nding. In fact, when market
perceives that a rating event is approaching, probably both the interest for bonds
and their liquidity tend to increase, thus reducing the liquidity premium. In case
of negative events, the reduction of the liquidity premium can partly o®set the
increase of the premium related to expected losses, thus leaving the overall OASs
almost unchanged. In case of positive events, instead, both premia move in the same
direction, and this can explain why the relationship between the bond market and
rating events look stronger with this kind of events.




MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA USED IN THE PAPER
No. Name
Country Currency CDS spreads (3) OASs (3) Stock prices (4)
(1) (2) Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
1 Abbey National GB EUR 22 10 67 56 10 124 95 71 121
2 ABN Amro Holding NL EUR 24 12 66 35 6 81 73 35 102
3 Banca Intesa IT EUR 20 11 47 60 28 136 82 44 119
4 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena IT EUR 27 15 90 41 0 77 85 56 121
5 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro IT EUR 23 17 41 34 19 45 69 29 120
6 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria ES EUR 17 8 46 45 3 87 82 49 103
7 Banco Comercial Portugues PT EUR 18 9 52 75 23 133 73 42 101
8 Banco Espirito Santo PT EUR 15 8 31 35 9 63 86 56 108
9 Banco Santander Central Hispano ES EUR 12 8 27 20 10 27 77 38 102
10 Bank of America US USD 24 13 76 31 -6 71 86 47 115
11 Barclays GB EUR 48 18 182 50 16 109 85 25 188
12 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank DE EUR 49 15 226 49 3 113 80 29 149
13 Bear Stearns Companies US USD 30 9 138 46 14 97 82 48 102
14 BNP Paribas FR EUR 21 9 65 35 17 67 80 50 106
15 Citigroup US USD 30 12 85 45 9 93 109 59 195
16 Commerzbank DE EUR 28 12 83 88 21 233 98 72 113
17 Cr¶ edit Agricole FR EUR 19 8 59 33 -2 68 87 51 110
18 Credit Suisse Group CH EUR 24 13 50 42 27 62 82 39 128
19 Deutsche Bank DE EUR 17 9 36 72 16 230 87 66 103
20 Dexia BE EUR 16 8 36 46 24 85 97 71 122
21 Fortis BE EUR 15 8 35 16 4 26 90 56 112
22 Goldman Sachs Group US USD 16 9 26 38 21 51 86 62 104
(1) Home countries of the banks: BE=Belgium, CH=Switzerland, DE=Germany, ES=Spain, FR=France, GB=United
Kingdom, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, NL=The Netherlands, PT=Portugal, US=United States. - (2) Reference currency of the
CDS contracts used in the paper. - (3) Basis points. - (4) Stock prices levels. Data are normalized to be equal to 100 in the
last day included in the data set.2
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Table 1 cont.
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA USED IN THE PAPER
No. Name
Country Currency CDS spreads (3) OASs (3) Stock prices (4)
(1) (2) Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
23 HBOS GB EUR 15 8 29 41 23 74 107 61 170
24 HSBC Holdings GB EUR 29 11 63 79 21 166 76 51 104
25 JPMorgan Chase US USD 22 10 49 65 39 117 104 49 185
26 Lehman Brothers Holdings US USD 26 14 76 85 43 196 99 58 120
27 Lloyds TSB Group GB EUR 28 15 65 91 43 183 88 58 109
28 Merrill Lynch US EUR 45 18 128 114 51 224 96 44 124
29 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group JP EUR 24 13 42 71 39 132 86 63 103
30 Mizuho Financial Group JP USD 33 14 81 97 49 186 83 55 111
31 Morgan Stanley US USD 45 22 99 95 42 196 94 55 119
32 Royal Bank of Scotland Group GB EUR 49 23 126 100 40 210 85 48 109
33 SanPaolo IMI IT EUR 46 22 98 120 56 223 82 55 106
34 Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale FR EUR 50 30 133 75 42 127 91 67 110
35 Standard Chartered GB EUR 51 24 118 107 45 215 68 41 102
36 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group JP USD 49 21 115 103 41 204 73 43 105
37 UBS CH EUR 26 14 73 108 57 228 88 38 122
38 UFJ Holdings JP USD 48 16 162 143 69 269 70 12 108
39 UniCredito Italiano IT EUR 40 15 98 115 54 259 76 22 114
40 Wachovia US USD 86 16 223 219 68 451 69 15 136
41 Washington Mutual US USD 15 8 38 21 4 51 77 47 100
42 Wells Fargo US USD 37 13 170 76 21 247 84 38 136
All sample 31 8 226 71 -6 451 85 12 195
(1) Home countries of the banks: BE=Belgium, CH=Switzerland, DE=Germany, ES=Spain, FR=France, GB=United
Kingdom, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, NL=The Netherlands, PT=Portugal, US=United States. - (2) Reference currency of the
CDS contracts used in the paper. - (3) Basis points. - (4) Stock prices levels. Data are normalized to be equal to 100 in the
last day included in the data set.26
Table 2
NUMBER OF EVENTS USED TO STUDY ABNORMAL
PRICE CHANGES CONDITIONAL ON RATING EVENTS (1)
Total Moody's S&P Fitch
Negative rating events 35 8 17 12
of which:
Reviews for downgrade 14 4 9 3
Downgrades 21 4 8 9
Positive rating events 45 20 21 6
of which:
Reviews for upgrade 14 7 7 2
Upgrades 31 13 14 4
(1) These data are used in ¯gures 1 to 4 and tables 3 and 4. In the total, rating
events of the same type occurred in the same day from di®erent rating agencies






























































ABNORMAL PRICE CHANGES CONDITIONAL ON ...
Time windows
[-40,-2] [-1,1] [2,5] [-40,5]
... NEGATIVE RATING EVENTS (1)
CDS spreads
Average CAPCs (2) 7.0 1.8 0.7 9.6
(0.00) (0.01) (0.36) (0.00)
Positive CAPCs (3) 74.3 57.1 48.6 77.1
(0.00) (0.25) (0.63) (0.00)
OASs
Average CAPCs (2) 4.9 1.1 2.1 8.1
(0.12) (0.18) (0.05) (0.04)
Positive CAPCs (3) 80.0 62.9 57.1 80.0
(0.00) (0.09) (0.25) (0.00)
Stock prices
Average CAPCs (2) -7.8 -1.8 0.9 -8.7
(0.00) (0.04) (0.22) (0.00)
Negative CAPCs (3) 62.9 62.9 48.6 71.4
(0.09) (0.09) (0.63) (0.01)
... REVIEWS FOR DOWNGRADE (1)
CDS spreads
Average CAPCs (2) 6.4 1.3 6.1 13.8
(0.00) (0.05) (0.08) (0.00)
Positive CAPCs (3) 78.6 64.3 57.1 78.6
(0.03) (0.21) (0.40) (0.03)
OASs
Average CAPCs (2) -0.5 1.8 1.6 2.9
(0.43) (0.14) (0.26) (0.42)
Positive CAPCs (3) 78.6 64.3 64.3 78.6
(0.03) (0.21) (0.21) (0.03)
Stock prices
Average CAPCs (2) -14.9 -3.5 1.5 -16.9
(0.00) (0.04) (0.18) (0.00)
Negative CAPCs (3) 78.6 71.4 50.0 85.7
(0.03) (0.09) (0.60) (0.01)
... DOWNGRADES (1)
CDS spreads
Average CAPCs (2) 7.4 2.2 -2.8 6.8
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Positive CAPCs (3) 71.4 52.4 42.9 76.2
(0.04) (0.50) (0.81) (0.01)
OASs
Average CAPCs (2) 8.6 0.5 2.4 11.5
(0.00) (0.38) (0.05) (0.00)
Positive CAPCs (3) 81.0 61.9 52.4 81.0
(0.00) (0.19) (0.50) (0.00)
Stock prices
Average CAPCs (2) -3.1 -0.6 0.5 -3.3
(0.20) (0.30) (0.41) (0.21)
Negative CAPCs (3) 52.4 57.1 47.6 61.9
(0.50) (0.33) (0.67) (0.19)
(1) P-values are shown in parentheses. Numbers in bold type are signi¯cant at
the 5 per cent level. - (2) CDS spreads and OASs changes are in basis points,
stock prices changes are in percentage points. P-values are calculated using
bootstrap techniques. - (3) Percentages. P-values are calculated under the null






























































ABNORMAL PRICE CHANGES CONDITIONAL ON ...
Time windows
[-40,-2] [-1,1] [2,5] [-40,5]
... POSITIVE RATING EVENTS (1)
CDS spreads
Average CAPCs (2) 0.5 -0.3 -0.8 -0.6
(0.23) (0.04) (0.00) (0.23)
Negative CAPCs (3) 42.2 62.2 71.1 60.0
(0.88) (0.07) (0.00) (0.12)
OASs
Average CAPCs (2) -3.4 -1.1 0.4 -4.1
(0.03) (0.05) (0.31) (0.01)
Negative CAPCs (3) 66.7 64.4 53.3 71.1
(0.02) (0.04) (0.38) (0.00)
Stock prices
Average CAPCs (2) 1.1 1.4 0.2 2.7
(0.26) (0.00) (0.25) (0.04)
Positive CAPCs (3) 51.1 48.9 57.8 57.8
(0.50) (0.62) (0.19) (0.19)
... REVIEWS FOR UPGRADE (1)
CDS spreads
Average CAPCs (2) 0.1 -1.1 -0.6 -1.6
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27)
Negative CAPCs (3) 42.9 71.4 92.9 71.4
(0.79) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09)
OASs
Average CAPCs (2) -2.3 -2.0 2.9 -1.4
(0.20) (0.05) (0.02) (0.33)
Negative CAPCs (3) 57.1 64.3 42.9 64.3
(0.40) (0.21) (0.79) (0.21)
Stock prices
Average CAPCs (2) 8.7 1.7 -0.6 9.7
(0.01) (0.04) (0.12) (0.01)
Positive CAPCs (3) 71.4 42.9 42.9 71.4
(0.09) (0.79) (0.79) (0.09)
... UPGRADES (1)
CDS spreads
Average CAPCs (2) 0.7 -0.0 -0.9 -0.2
(0.08) (0.49) (0.00) (0.39)
Negative CAPCs (3) 41.9 58.1 61.3 54.8
(0.86) (0.24) (0.14) (0.36)
OASs
Average CAPCs (2) -4.0 -0.7 -0.7 -5.3
(0.05) (0.18) (0.30) (0.01)
Negative CAPCs (3) 71.0 64.5 58.1 74.2
(0.01) (0.07) (0.24) (0.01)
Stock prices
Average CAPCs (2) -2.3 1.2 0.6 -0.5
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.34)
Positive CAPCs (3) 41.9 51.6 64.5 51.6
(0.86) (0.50) (0.07) (0.50)
(1) P-values are shown in parentheses. Numbers in bold type are signi¯cant at
the 5 per cent level. - (2) CDS spreads and OASs changes are in basis points,
stock prices changes are in percentage points. P-values are calculated using
bootstrap techniques. - (3) Percentages. P-values are calculated under the null


























































































































PREDICTING NEGATIVE RATING EVENTS: I (1)
Case [-40,40] CDS spreads OASs Stock prices
Probit model (2)
® -1.7709 -1.7128 -1.7466
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¯ 0.0424 0.0080 -0.0245
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0659 0.0070 0.0348
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0242 0.0025 0.0127
Percentiles (3)
q=50 69.50-74.33 58.26-63.43 59.47-64.55
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=75 53.60-58.58 37.43-42.56 38.54-43.92
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=90 33.36-38.15 18.34-22.62 27.10-31.97
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=99 10.59-13.42 2.33-4.16 5.39-7.76
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
Case [-120,40] CDS spreads OASs Stock prices
Probit model (2)
® -1.9679 -1.9206 -1.9317
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¯ 0.0275 0.0021 -0.0110
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0419 0.0010 0.0135
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0107 0.0002 0.0034
Percentiles (3)
q=50 53.65-61.49 49.92-57.88 48.04-55.77
(0.05-0.00) (0.53-0.00) (0.84-0.00)
q=75 36.58-44.65 30.66-38.54 28.48-35.61
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.03-0.00)
q=90 26.55-33.57 10.88-16.22 14.29-20.29
(0.00-0.00) (0.25-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=99 6.85-10.92 0.00-0.00 4.93-8.77
(0.00-0.00) (1.00-1.00) (0.00-0.00)
(1) P-values are shown in parentheses. - (2) Parameters of the model P =
©(® + ¯x), where x is the cumulative abnormal price change (CAPC) in an
interval of 40 or 120 days, P is the probability that a negative rating event
occurs in the following 40 days and © is the standard normal CDF. - (3) 95-per-
cent con¯dence intervals of the percentage of negative rating events occurred
during the 40 days following the time intervals, of length 40 or 120 days, during
which the CAPCs have been greater than the q percentile (or smaller than
the (100 ¡ q) percentile for stocks). P-values are calculated under the null
hyphotesis that a negative rating event occurs with probability (100 ¡ q)=100.34
Table 5.b
PREDICTING NEGATIVE RATING EVENTS: II (1)
Case [-40,40] Model A Model B Model C
Probit model (2)












McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0806 0.1128 0.1741
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0298 0.0550 0.0865
Case [-120,40] Model A Model B Model C
Probit model (2)












McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0421 0.1545 0.2246
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0107 0.0701 0.1043
(1) P-values are shown in parentheses. - (2) Parameters of the model P =
©(®+¯0x), where x is a vector of cumulative abnormal price changes and two
dummy variables for positive and negative events, in an interval of 40 or 120
days, P is the probability that a negative rating event occurs in the following
40 days and © is the standard normal CDF.35
Table 5.c
PREDICTING NEGATIVE RATING EVENTS: III (1)
Case [-40,40] CDS OASs Stock Model Model Model
spreads prices A B C
Correct positive predictions (2) 24.82 12.14 21.75 26.32 34.61 37.62
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incorrect negative predictions (3) 3.45 4.03 3.59 3.38 4.43 4.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percentage of negative events (4) 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 6.35 6.35
Case [-120,40] CDS OASs Stock Model Model Model
spreads prices A B C
Correct positive predictions (2) 11.39 0.85 8.16 11.73 23.90 42.72
(0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incorrect negative predictions (3) 2.49 2.79 2.58 2.48 4.54 3.41
(0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percentage of negative events (4) 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 5.63 5.63
(1) A negative event is assumed to be predicted if the probit model estimated a probability
of occurrence greater than the threshold that makes the number of predicted events equal
to the number of realized events. - (2) Percentage of correct predictions of negative events.
- (3) Percentage of incorrect predictions that there would be no negative events. - (4)
Percentage of negative events out of the total number of observations.36
Table 6.a
PREDICTING POSITIVE RATING EVENTS: I (1)
Case [-40,40] CDS spreads OASs Stock prices
Probit model (2)
® -1.5756 -1.5727 -1.5839
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¯ -0.0103 -0.0028 0.0117
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0032 0.0008 0.0094
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0014 0.0004 0.0042
Percentiles (3)
q=50 49.15-53.69 53.70-58.21 41.92-46.51
(0.77-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (1.00-1.00)
q=75 29.27-33.61 29.25-33.61 26.71-30.83
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.06-0.00)
q=90 14.25-17.49 14.03-17.30 17.32-21.01
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=99 2.07-3.54 0.06-0.52 5.64-7.70
(0.00-0.00) (1.00-0.99) (0.00-0.00)
Case [-120,40] CDS spreads OASs Stock prices
Probit model (2)
® -1.7958 -1.7788 -1.8126
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
¯ -0.0175 -0.0074 0.0143
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0290 0.0142 0.0494
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0099 0.0048 0.0169
Percentiles (3)
q=50 71.02-76.75 67.61-73.48 56.49-62.59
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=75 47.40-53.94 42.84-49.06 34.76-40.85
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=90 23.14-28.79 21.96-27.66 24.14-29.77
(0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00) (0.00-0.00)
q=99 1.55-4.80 0.00-0.60 7.44-11.29
(0.08-0.00) (1.00-0.92) (0.00-0.00)
(1) P-values are shown in parentheses. - (2) Parameters of the model P =
©(® + ¯x), where x is the cumulative abnormal price change (CAPC) in an
interval of 40 or 120 days, P is the probability that a positive rating event occurs
in the following 40 days and © is the standard normal CDF. - (3) 95-per-cent
con¯dence intervals of the percentage of positive rating events occurred during
the 40 days following the time intervals, of length 40 or 120 days, during which
the CAPCs have been smaller than the (100 ¡ q) percentile (or greater than
the q percentile for stocks). P-values are calculated under the null hyphotesis
that a positive rating event occurs with probability (100 ¡ q)=100.37
Table 6.b
PREDICTING POSITIVE RATING EVENTS: II (1)
Case [-40,40] Model A Model B Model C
Probit model (2)












McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0100 0.0737 0.0833
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0044 0.0373 0.0423
Case [-120,40] Model A Model B Model C
Probit model (2)












McFadden pseudo-R2 0.0537 0.1603 0.1779
Estrella pseudo-R2 0.0184 0.0874 0.0975
(1) P-values are shown in parentheses. - (2) Parameters of the model P =
©(®+¯0x), where x is a vector of cumulative abnormal price changes and two
dummy variables for positive and negative events, in an interval of 40 or 120
days, P is the probability that a positive rating event occurs in the following
40 days and © is the standard normal CDF.38
Table 6.c
PREDICTING POSITIVE RATING EVENTS: III (1)
Case [-40,40] CDS OASs Stock Model Model Model
spreads prices A B C
Correct positive predictions (2) 11.03 9.91 15.07 14.00 25.82 30.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incorrect negative predictions (3) 5.50 5.57 5.25 5.32 5.41 5.10
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percentage of positive events (4) 5.82 5.82 5.82 5.82 6.80 6.80
Case [-120,40] CDS OASs Stock Model Model Model
spreads prices A B C
Correct positive predictions (2) 11.47 7.42 16.92 15.18 29.20 28.89
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Incorrect negative predictions (3) 3.70 3.87 3.47 3.54 5.59 5.62
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percentage of positive events (4) 4.01 4.01 4.01 4.01 7.32 7.32
(1) A positive event is assumed to be predicted if the probit model estimated a probability
of occurrence greater than the threshold that makes the number of predicted events equal
to the number of realized events. - (2) Percentage of correct predictions of positive events.
- (3) Percentage of incorrect predictions that there would be no positive events. - (4)
Percentage of positive events out of the total number of observations.39
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